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Foreign Labour Migration and the Remittance 
Economy of Nepal 
David Seddon with Ganesh Gurung and Jagannath Adhikari 
Agriculture in Pe r spective 
Most studies of Nepal emphasise the crucial 
importance of agriculture in the national economy, and 
ce1iainly agriculture has been and remains at the centre 
of planning for development. Indeed, the Agriculture 
Perspective Plan (APP)-the major strategy document 
adopted successively by governments of various 
political persuasions over the last few years as the 
corner stone of their development strategy -argues that 
agriculture must and will provide the basis for economic 
development over the next two decades and beyond. 
Although this view is debatable (see John Cameron's 
critique of the APP in this issue of the HRB), it has 
recently been endorsed by the World Bank (1998), which 
refers in its poverty assessment of Nepal to 'the 
centrality of agriculture' in Nepal's development. 
Certainly, it seems at first sight that agriculture 
remains crucial. Even in 1996, according to the Nepal 
Living Standards Survey (NLSS), over 78 per cent of 
those actively employed spent the majority of their time 
in agriculture; and the World Bank has recently argued 
that "agriculture plays a central role for all" : with 86 per 
cent of households cultivating some land, 80 per cent 
having some livestock, and agriculture constituting the 
main sector of employment for 83 per cent of all 
individuals in the labour force (World Bank, Nepal: 
Poverty at the Turn of the Twenty First 
Century. 1998: 14) . 
But agriculture has failed so far to experience that 
progressive transformation that in other countries has 
heralded the beginning of the transition from agrarian to 
industrial economy and society. The 'Green Revolution' 
has been a long time arriving, although the authors of 
the APP argue that it is still possible if their 
prescriptions are followed . Agriculture has been for 
many years a sector of slow growth, some would say 
stagnation (over the last 20 years agricultural GDP has 
grown at an average of only 2.6 per cent a year), while 
other sectors have experienced relatively rapid growth. 
Today only about 40 per cent of GDP comes from 
agriculture and a significant and increasing proportion 
comes from the non-agricultural sectors, while a larger 
proportion of the rural population depends more and 
more heavily on non-farm income. 
Remittances and Migration 
The importance of non-farm mcome for rural 
livelihoods is not new. A study in the mid- 1970s (by 
ARTEP) showed that in the majority of cases, the total 
net income of rural households was derived from more 
than one source. In the hills only 0.2 per cent of the 
households sampled obtained all their income from a 
single source; in the terai, the percentage of households 
depending on one income source was 9.8 per cent and 
most of those were landless. Roughly 25 per cent of 
household income in both hills and terai came from 
non-farm sources, notably from wages and salaries, 
pensions and remittances. In 1980, a study conducted by 
the National Planning Commission estimated that 35 
per cent of total household income in rural Nepal came 
from non-farm and off-farm earnings. 
What might be termed 'the remittance economy' is 
of major significance both as a source of foreign 
exchange and as a source of income to many households 
and local communities throughout the country, 
particularly (but by no means only) in the hill areas. 
Also, foreign labour migration and the value of 
remittances have increased substantially in the last ten 
years. In 1996 the NLSS estimated that for households 
which received remittances those remittances accounted 
on average for about a quarter of household income, 
although the share was higher in the hills (30 per cent) 
and in the western region (33 per cent). In rural areas, 
25 per cent of remittances came from urban areas, 33 
per cent from other rural areas, 40 per cent from India 
and 3 per cent from 'other countries.' 
Significantly, the bulk of rural non-farm and off-
farm income comes from activities undertaken outside 
the village. This implies migration to work, which 
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includes: i) daily commuting, ii) short-term and local 
migration to nearby towns, iii) seasonal migration to 
other localities within Nepal or India, and iv) temporary 
but 'long term' (over six months) migration. Long term 
migration may involve a) essentially casual and 
generally low-paid work, b) more reliable waged 
employment or c) relatively secure salaried 
employment, elsewhere in Nepal or abroad. In 1990, the 
World Bank, in its study of poverty in Nepal, concluded 
that "the income effects of migration are not well 
documented. It is recommended that further research be 
undertaken on them" (World Bank 1990: 45, footnote 
27). 
The Response of the Development Agencies 
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to this 
suggestion. The increasing importance for rural 
households and for the rural economy as a whole of 
non-farm and off-farm income and remittances from 
migrant workers elsewhere--of whkh 43 per cent 
comes, for rural households, from employment 
abroad-has been largely ignored. Even recent attempts 
to map out strategic approaches for Nepal's development 
(such as the APP or the World Bank's poverty 
assessment) have paid little attention to labour 
migration and remittances, seeing them generally as an 
unfortunate and marginal by-product of a stagnant rural 
economy, to be eliminated progressively by 
programmes for economic development within Nepal, 
and within the agricultural sector. 
Only in the last year (1998-99 AD) has there been 
any public recognition (by government or other 
agencies) of the policy implications of the substantial 
flow of labour out of the country and the massive return 
flow of remittances into the country. But what 
discussion there has been, and what policy measures 
have been suggested, have been based unfortunately on 
an inadequate understanding of the dynamics of 'the 
remittance economy of Nepal,' largely because there has 
been no attempt until hitherto to bring together the 
existing information and to collect primary data on this 
subject. As Dixit has pointed out recently: "the 
remittances by migrant labour make a singular 
contribution to the national economy, but they find no 
mention in national economic calculations, and 
certainly not in the figures and forecasts of the National 
Planning Commission" (Dixit et al. Himal. 1997: 
10). 
Adhikari makes a similar observation (in his book, 
The Beginnings of Agrarian Change), with 
reference to the lack of studies of how remittances· affect 
local village and household economies: 
4 
another common and rather surprising deficiency 
is that most research studies conducted in Nepal 
have paid little attention to the growing role of 
off-farm work in the village rind household 
economy. Even though a few studies give some 
account of off-farm employment . . . , iheir 
main concern has been with the relative size of 
the income generated, rather than with its role 
in the livelihoods strategies of different village 
groups. That is to say, they have not given 
much attention as to how access to off-farm 
income is · ethnically selective; and how such 
selective access has affected the livelihood 
strategies of ethnic groups or individual 
households, often in neighbouring villages 
(1996: 21). 
We have therefore undertaken a programme of 
investigation over the last two years into 'the remittance 
economy' of Nepal, at all levels-national, regional and 
local. The research (funded and supported by the British 
Government through the Department for International 
Development (DfiD) in South East Asia) on which this 
paper is based is the first attempt to provide a coherent 
overview and preliminary analysis of 'the remittance 
economy of Nepal.' The research is not yet completed 
and what follows is a preliminary report on 'work-in-
progress.' 
The Scale of Remittances from Abroad 
During the second half of the 1970s the recorded 
value of money sent back from abroad more than 
doubled, from Rs 90.7 mn in 1974-75 to Rs 2 16.8 mn 
by 1980-81. Over the next decade, the official value of 
foreign remittances increased three-fold, to reach Rs 
676.8 mn by I 989-90; this was just under half of the 
value of tourist receipts and a seventh of total exports. 
Despite their considerable increase, the value of 
remittances as a proportion of total foreign exchange 
earnings declined as tourism and exports grew. Even so, 
it has been estimated that, in the mid-1980s, Nepal was 
gaining nearly $47 million annually as foreign 
exchange from British Gurkhas as salary, remittances 
and pensions, and Indian currency worth $100 million 
from those in the Indian Army. 
By the middle of the 1990s the value of officially 
recorded remittances from abroad was around Rs 2.9 
billion-well over half the value of tourist receipts and 
a fifth of total exports. Of this, 'Gorkha remittances' 
accounted for between a quarter and a third. If this figure 
were to be taken at face value it would represent about 
7.7 per cent of foreign exchange earnings, putting it 
well below countries like Bangladesh, where 32 per cent 
of foreign exchange earnings come from migrant labour 
(Shanti Nair, The World Today, March 1998, p. 
66). All of our research so far, however, suggests that 
official figures indicate the tip of a much larger iceberg. 
Illegal migrants overseas (notably in the Far East 
and, to a lesser extent in Europe) and migrants working 
in India send their remittances back home through 
various channels, all of which share the characte1istic 
that they are not formally recorded. Even those working 
legally abroad send their money home in a variety of 
ways-most of them unrecorded. The official figures are 
known to be a gross underestimate of the total value of 
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remittances; but it has not been recognised until now 
just how gross an underestimate is involved. 
Our conservative estimates-based on i) a detailed 
investigation of the numbers of migrant workers (legal 
and illegal) known to be working in all countries, ii) 
average wages and iii) estimated average remittances per 
month sent home-suggest that, instead of Rs 2.9 
billion, a figure closer to Rs 35 billion was sent 
back in 1997 (our reference year). Note that this 
estimate includes from India only remittances from 
those in public sector employment, whose numbers are 
known; it does not include the remittances sent back by 
the vast numbers of Nepalese migrant workers 
unofficially employed in the private sector in India. 
Even so, our estimated value of remittances to Nepal 
is not very much less than the official figure for a II 
foreign exchange earnings combined (from merchandise 
and other exports, foreign aid, tourism, remittances and 
other sources) -a total of Rs 38.3 billion (according to 
the Nepal Rastra Bank's Quarterly Economic 
Bulletin, vol. xxxi, nos. 3 & 4, 1997, p. 54). Given 
that national GDP was estimated at around Rs 280 
billion in FY 1996/97, this would mean that total value 
of remittances from international migrant workers was 
roughly equal to the official value of all foreign 
exchange earnings combined, and to 13 per cent of 
GDP. 
This is, we emphasise, a conservative estimate. The 
value of remittances coming from India is certainly 
considerably higher than our estimate based on public 
sector employees alone (Rs 6 billion) . If, as the NLSS 
suggests, remittances from India account for 33 per cent 
of all money sent back home by migrant workers 
(including those working within Nepal) as compared 
with 22 per cent from 'other countries,' then the overall 
figure could be as high as Rs 69 billion (Rs 40 bn from 
India and Rs 29 bn-ie Rs 35 bn less Rs 6bn-from 
'other countries'). This would be roughly 
equivalent to 25 per cent of GDP. 
Regional Patterns of Workers Abroad 
The official number of those living and working 
abroad increased during the 1980s, from around 400,000 
in 1981 to around 660,000 by 1991 (although this 
figure does not reliably identify labour migrants). This 
constituted about 3.3 percent of Nepal's total population 
- over I 0 per cent of the economically active 
population. This is not surprising: between 10 and 30 
per cent of the ·labour force in India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh works overseas, according to N<1ir (1998: 
66). The vast majority (89 per cent)-albeit a smaller 
proportion than in 1981 (93 per cent)- went to "India, 
but a significant proportion (11 per cent) and number 
(71,000) were now apparently going elsewhere (Gurung 
1998: 19). 
Broadly speaking there are four major world regions 
where Nepalese migrants currently find employment: 1) 
the West (northern Europe and north America), 2) the 
Far East and South East Asia, 3) the Gulf and 4) India. 
There is a small number of Nepalese workers employed 
outside these four regions. 
The smallest numbers are to be fo und in region one, 
and many Nepalis living and working in this region cb 
not send remittances back home; particularly in north 
America, many are people working professionally, often 
accompanied by their families . Our (conservative) 
estimates for 1997 suggest a total of around 12,500 
Nepalis working in Europe and perhaps as many as 
2,500 in North America-making a total of around 
15,000 Nepalis in this region as a whole . The largest 
number in any single country is in the UK, where 
3,600 are officially registered and an estimated 8,000 
more work unofficially. We have estimated that the 
European migrants alone sent back around Rs 4.4 
billion in 1997, of which the major part (Rs 4.1 
billion) came from the UK, much of it accounted for by 
those in the British army. From North America we 
estimate a total of some Rs 50 million. 
The second smallest number of Nepali workers in 
1997 were in region two-the Gulf- a region which 
has opened up to Nepali workers dramatically in the last 
few years . A total of some 40,000 Nepalese migrants 
were working in the Gulf, most of them-but by no 
means all-both legal and official. We estimate that in 
total these migrant workers sent back around Rs 1.5 
billion (Rs 720 mn . from Saudi Arabia, Rs 360 mn . 
each from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates and Rs 
18 mn each from Kuwait and Oman). Since 1997 the 
numbers have increased significantly and may now 
number about 90,000. 
The region (apart from India) from which the great 
majority of remittances comes into Nepal is that of East 
and South East Asia. We estimate a minimum of some 
44,000 Nepalese migrants in this region, at least half of 
them working illegally and sending money back 
through 'informal channels.' In Japan, .for example, we 
have estimated some I 0,000 migrant workers, most of 
them illegal. In general, and particularly for those 
working in East Asia, the average value per migrant of 
remittances sent back is high. A relatively conservative 
estimate produces a total of around Rs 23 billion in 
remittances from this region . Of this, the majority by 
far comes from Hong Kong (Rs 14.4 ·billion); some Rs 
6 billion comes from Japan, around Rs 1 billion from 
Brunei and just under Rs 1 billion from Singapore. 
Other countries where Nepali migrant workers are 
known to be employed include: Saipan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Maldives, and the 
Philippines. From among these countries, the largest 
amount comes from South Korea -Rs 256 million. 
Finally, there is India. According to the NLSS, in 
terms of absolute monetary value, India provided the 
largest share (33 per cent) of total remittances, followed 
by urban Nepal (32 per cent), 'other countries' (22 per 
cent) and rural Nepal (12 per cent). By all accounts, 
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'hundreds of thousands' of Nepalis are working in India; 
the total could be as high as 1 million. But, apart from 
the 250,000 known to be working in the public sector, 
we are not yet in a position to estimate the total 
number working there. Suffice it to say that, on the 
basis of registered employees alone , we estimate a 
total value of remittances of Rs 6 billion, although if 
the proportion coming into Nepal from India is in fact 
33 per cent of all remittances, then the figure could be 
closer toRs 40 billion. This would not be so surprising 
if we were to accept the estimates of those who see 
"more than a million individuals from a population of 
2 1 million leaving home to work (in India)" (Dixit et 
a!. 1997: 1 0) . 
Table 1 Summary of International Migrant Workers and Remittances 
region 
1. The West 
2. The Gulf 
3. The Far East 
4. India 
5. Others 
Total 
numbers of workers 
15,000 
90,000 
34,000 
250,000 + 
1,000 
392,000 + 
remittances 
4.4 bn 
1.5 bn 
23 bn 
6 bn + 
35 bn + 
NB If India has 1 million workers who send back Rs 40 bn, instead of Rs 6 bn, the total would be Rs 69 bn . 
While the overall volume and value of total 
remittances coming into Nepal from the large numbers 
of Nepalese working abroad is enormous, the scale and 
significance of remittances reaching the rural areas 
varies from region to region and from social group to 
social group; even from village to village and from 
household to household. Access to employment abroad 
is uneven spatially and socially; so too is the 
distribution of the rewards . 
Patterns of Access to Employment 
Access to employment abroad is regulated in a 
variety of ways, both formal and informal. The process 
of recruitment differs significantly, depending upon the 
form of employment and the region to which the 
migrant workers goes; the relative importance of 
personal networks and pre-existing linkages between 
'place of origin' and 'place of work' also varies 
considerably. 
Access to Employment 'Overseas ' 
Employment in the British army, for example, 
involves formal selection procedures but access is also 
strongly affected by ethnicity and family or vill age 
connections. Historically, the Gurungs and Magars of 
the western hills have been particularly favoured as 
recruit.s, as have (to a ·lesser extent) the Rais and 
Limbus of the eastern hills. Other ethnic· groups and 
castes are in theory acceptable, but are recruited in far 
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smaller numbers. There is a high degree of continuity in 
recruitment, leading in effect to a concentration on 
certain regions, certain villages and even certain 
families. This is particularly the case now that the 
numbers recruited are quite small. The benefits of 
employment in 'the Gurkhas' have consequently also 
been spatially and socially concentrated within Nepal. 
Access to employment in the Indian army, by contrast, 
is far less narrowly determined, although the formal 
recruitment procedures here too are affected in practice 
by certain ethnic and caste preferences. The degree of 
concentration in employment is much less, however, as 
is the concentration of benefits; also, far greater 
numbers are employed in the Indian army and the 
overall value of remittances is significantly greater, 
even if average remittances are smaller. 
Recruitment for overseas employment in Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, 
Oman, and Kuwait in the Gulf, and for Malaysia, 
Brunei, Hong Kong, Saipan and South Korea in East 
and South East Asia is officially undertaken through 
procedures involving the Ministry of Labour and 
registered manpower agencies. There are currently over 
100 registered manpower agencies in Kathmandu, of 
which, however, only some two thirds are officially in 
operation-and far fewer actually operate on a 
significant scale. Normally, the Nepalese agency will 
take the responsibility for acquiring all of the necessary 
official permission and documents for the migrant 
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worker, and will also liaise with the employer in the 
country of destination. 
The official process is often slow and laborious. 
Nepalese agencies are able sometimes to short-circuit 
this by by-passing some of the registration procedures. 
In such instances, the migrant workers may be legally 
but unofficially recruited and will not appear in any 
official statistics produced by the Ministry of Labour; 
they are also more open to abuses, including fraud. 
Officially, agencies may take one month's salary in 
· advance as commission; generally they charge between 
Rs 30,000 and Rs 80,000 per person. Of the total 
advance provided by the would-be employee, the 
Nepalese agency generally takes about 55 per cent. 
There is then usually at least one further stage 
(involving an intermediary agency) accounting for a 
further 20 per cent or 40 per cent (if two agencies are 
involved). Sometimes there is a direct link between the 
employer and the Nepalese agencies, in which case the 
latter will take the lion's share of the 'commission.' In 
rare cases only will an employer grant work permits and 
visas directly to Nepali workers; this is usually where 
existing Nepalese employees are able to convince an 
employer that a relative or friend of theirs would be 
appropriate. There is ample opportunity for fraud here, 
and there is much anecdotal evidence to suggest that this 
is not uncommon. Recently, some registered manpower 
agencies have been closed down or prosecuted by the 
government for breach of agreements and requirements. 
Procedures for recruitment to the Gulf are relatively 
highly regulated . Partly for this reason, and partly 
because this is a new region for Nepalese migrant 
workers and the nature of employment is generally that 
involving unskilled labour, the informal mechanisms 
which serve to 'screen' access to many employment 
opportunities in other regions (ethnic and caste origin, 
personal networks, etc.) are for the time being of less 
significance in recruitment to this region than they are 
for other regions. It seems that a wide range of young 
men from a variety of social backgrounds have been 
recruited for employment in the Gulf, mainly in 
construction and road building. 
Generally, the countries of East Asia are the most 
desirable in terms of wages, working conditions and 
possibilities for accumulation. However, despite some 
agreements regarding recruitment of Nepalese workers 
with the governments of Hong Kong, Brunei, South 
Korea and Malaysia, countries in this region are 
generally restrictive as regards to immigration for 
employment. A very substantial proportion of those 
working in East and South East Asia, therefore, work 
illegally. A proportion of those employed in Europe are 
also employed unofficially and even illegally. 
Under these circumstances migrants depend heavily 
on informal and personal connections and networks to 
obtain employment abroad. Unregistered brokers (hundi) 
are involved widely in facilitating Nepalese migration in 
search of work to those countries where there is no 
formal arrangement or procedure in operation. They may 
charge substantial fees, and not all are trustworthy. 
Usually they obtain tourist visas for their clients; as 
long as the visas remain valid, the illegal migrants are 
relatively safe, but after that they are liable to 
prosecution not only for working illegally but also for 
overstaying their visa. In some cases, even entry to the 
country is illegal. This, however, fails to prevent large 
scale migration. In Japan, for example, we estimate 
there to be only about 30 officially registered Nepalese 
workers but as many as 10,000 illegal migrant workers 
in reality . 
While access to employment in the Gulf would 
appear to be relatively unconstrained by class, ethnic 
and caste background (although the nature of the work 
tends to discourage would-be migrants from better-off 
families), the same cannot be said for access to 
employment in the West or in the Far East. Given the 
distances involved and the difficulties of access for other 
reasons, migration to North America and (albeit to a 
somewhat lesser extent) to Europe is generally limited 
to those with resources and with relatively good 
qualifications. The 'fees' that have to be paid to 
unofficial brokers to organise migration to the West are 
high, and for most are prohibitive. The majority of 
those migrating to North America to work are, it is 
thought, of Brahmin, Chettri and Newar origin-
although there is a Sherpa community in the USA of 
about 600 and scattered groupings of other ethnic 
groups. As regards to the UK, where the largest number 
of Nepalese workers in the West is to be found, the 
variety is considerable, although the predominance of 
British army employment implies that the majority are 
from the usual specific ethnic groups. 
In East Asia, the majority of migrant workers are 
from the hill ethnic groups-notably Gurungs, Magars 
and Thakalis (2,500 of these last in Japan) from the 
western hill and mountain regions, and Rais, Limbus 
and Sherpas from the eastern mountain and hill regions . 
In part this is explained by the connections with some 
of the countries of this region established through 
British army and commercial 'old-boy' networks; in 
part, perhaps, by physical appearance, which helps the 
illegal migrant to be less 'visible.' In South East Asia, 
there is a tendency for the same groups to be most 
heavily involved-although this is not well 
documented. 
Access to Employment in India 
The great advantage of labour migration to India is 
that there is no need for expensive air travel, there are 
no passports, visas, etc. required, and there is-at least 
officially-no restriction on access to employment. 
This is why the number of Nepalese migrant workers in 
India runs into the hundreds of thousands, if not as 
many as 1 million-far greater than for any other 
region-while the aggregate value of remittances is 
also, in reality, far greater than for any other region. 
.. .. . 
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Despite the increasing proportion of Nepalese 
foreign migrants going to 'other countries,' India 
remains by far the main source of employment; 
furthermore the exodus from Nepal to India has escalated 
over the last decades . As Dixit et al. remark: "today, at 
roadheads all over Nepal's terai, from Mahendranagar on 
the western border to Kakarbhitta in the east, there is a 
continuous tlow of Nepal is on the way to jobs in India 
or returning on leave. All over the Nepali hills this past 
October, as happens every year at the time of the Dasain 
festival, Nepali menfolk arrived home by the tens of 
thousands-bringing gifts, trinkets and household 
items, to snatch a few moments with parents, children, 
wives-before heading back down for another year of 
labour" (1997 : 12). 
It is not only from the hills, however, that Nepalese 
migrant workers leave to seek employment in India. 
Whereas not so long ago, Indian immigrants seeking 
work in the Nepalese terai were common, the trend is 
rather now the reverse . As a result of new employment 
opportunities in northern India, the Indian border 
labourers hardly come to Nepal anymore . Instead they 
go to some of these states in their own country where 
new development opportunities have opened up . But 
while the flow of Indian labourers has decreased, the 
tendency in the other direction has been growing. 
Furthermore, while earlier it was almost only the 
people from the hills (who went) to India for 
employment, for the last few years the people of the 
Nepalese border region (terai) have also started going to 
different parts of India for seasonal and for longer term 
employment. One commentator noted in 1995 that 
"there is hardly any village or town on the Nepalese side 
of the border from where the people do not migrate to 
India in certain seasons in search of employment. This 
new development has occurred due to the lack of 
employment opportunities within Nepal. " 
But if there are few formal restrictions regarding 
access to employment and no agencies or brokers 
involved, in practice, the process of recruitment and 
employment is far more complex and far more 
significantly determined by social networks and personal 
relations than for any other region to which Nepalese 
migrants travel in search of work. It is possible, 
nevertheless, to identify patterns of social networks and 
linkages which connect specific regions, districts and 
even villages of Nepal with particular towns and centres 
of employment in India. 
For example, Nepalese workers from the Far West 
tend to head for certain specific locations in India either 
westwards or along a broad route heading from notth to 
south down the western part of India. Most work in 
adjacent Uttar Pradesh, but others travel further afield. 
Dixit et al. indicate that "the population of the poverty-
stricken western hills . . . migrates to adjacent areas in 
India. Besides going to the nearby plains, some Nepalis 
from the far west also hike across into Uttarakhand, 
whose own menfolk migrate to Delhi to find better 
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work. In Uttarakhand, Nepalis (called Dotyals) serve as 
coolies in hill stations like Nainital and Mussoorie and 
carry loads for pilgrims-and the pilgrims themselves-
at holy locations such as Gaumukh and Kedarnath" 
(Dixit et al. 1997: 11). Punjabi landlords, and also 
those in Haryana and Western Uttar Pradesh, use Nepali 
workers as security guards and as seasonal labour for the 
fields as well. Across the Himalayan regions of 
northwest India, Nepali road gangs build and maintain 
mountain highways; in May 1997, Indian newspapers 
briefly noted the execution-style killing of eight Nepali 
labourers by militants at a stone-crushing factory in 
Kashmir Valley. 
Some travel farther afield, to Mumbai or Delhi. 
Sociologist Phanindra Paudyal, who studied Nepali 
labour in Bombay in 1988, reported that it was the rural 
poor of the far west districts of Nepal, such as Doti, 
Accham, Baitadi and Dadeldhura that landed up in India's 
financial capital: "with little or no education, and no 
off-farm experience, these migrants do not have access 
to the skilled jobs that are available. They find what 
work they can on the basis of their reputation as 'brave, 
sincere and honest Gorkhas"' (Paudyal, cited in Dixit et 
al. 1997: 16). 
Some travel east as far as Calcutta or Patna or even 
as far south as Madras or Bangalore: "at the sub-
continent's other extremity, in and around the city of 
Bangalore, villagers from Bajhang District in Nepal's far 
west have established a well-organised labour monopoly 
for themselves. According to Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, a 
Swiss anthropologist who has studied this trans-South 
Asian phenomenon, Bajhang survives on the basis of 
remittances from Bangalore" (Dixit et al. 1997: 11 ). 
The district of Bajhang exports a very high proportion 
of its male population as temporary migrants all over 
India; but 20 per cent end up in Bangalore -where there 
is a long-standing tradition of such migration-and 
other nearby south Indian cities. Bajhangis are mainly 
employed as guards and night watchmen in government 
offices, factories and shopping complexes (bazaars); "the 
ability to find jobs as watchmen is the outcome of the 
reputation which several generations of Bajhangis have 
acquired as 'brave and sincere' workers,'' according to 
Pfaff-Czarnecka. 
Similar linkages exist for other regions of Nepal 
between places of origin and destinations . In part this is 
a matter of geography, but more importantly it is a 
consequence of the way in which migration has evolved 
historically and migrants tend to seek opportunities in 
places where they have contacts and connections, where 
previous migrants from their place of origin are thought 
to have been successful, and where it is thought 
reasonable prospects of employment exist and access 
can be obtained. 
For example, although both the western and the 
eastern hill regions of Nepal are regions of high 
emigration, with a significant minority migrating 
overseas, the structure and pattern of migration differs 
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significantly. Whereas in the eastern hills and 
mountains (according to the NLSS), the bulk of 
remittances (56 per cent) comes from employment 
within Nepal (in the terai and in the towns) and 
relatively little from employment abroad (9 .6 per cent 
in India and 4.4 per cent in 'other countries'), in the 
western hills and mountains, the bulk of remittances 
(59 per cent) comes from employment abroad (55 per 
cent in India and 4 per cent from 'other countries'). 
Patterns of Inequality 
For labour migration in general, but for foreign 
labour migrat ion in particular, having the right 
connections is crucial if the risks are to be minimised 
and access to secure, reasonably well-paid employment 
is to be secured. Another barrier to access, however, is 
cost. In order to obtain the necessary pre-requisites for 
travel and employment abroad the prospective migrant 
worker usually needs to be able to invest 'up front' 
(whether officially or unofficially) and this requires the 
capacity to ri sk those resources in what is always an 
unce11ain venture . For those who do not have the 
necessary resources, the alternatives are to borrow (with 
the very substantial risk of indebtedness if the venture 
fails) or to seek employment where the 'entry costs' are 
lower. This ensures that there is a general tendency for 
the better-off to gain access more easily to the better 
paying jobs, often in the more 'desirable' countries; and 
for the majority of the poor to seek employment in 
India. Even for India, however, there maybe significant 
opportunity costs and risks involved . 
Thus, while international labour migration is widely 
recognised in Nepal as a possible means of increasing 
household income, it carries serious risks and may 
involve considerable investment; it also has major 
social implications, and is not undertaken without a 
great deal of consideration and thought. It seems that in 
general , the rural elites tend to prefer to seek 
employment within Nepal, in the bureaucracy and 
public service in particular, or to establish themselves 
in business and commercial enterprises in the private 
sector, rather than emigrate in search of employment. 
Sometimes, a wealthy family will encourage sons to 
migrate in search of employment, and a family tradition 
of migration may develop. On the whole, however, the 
wealthiest rural households tend to be less involved in 
international labour migration than the higher of the 
'middle ranking' social classes . But where the wealthiest 
households are involved, they tend to be able to secure 
better paying and more secure employment than most 
others. 
As for the poorest, not only are the effective 'entry 
costs' higher, but the probability of securing a well-
paying and reasonably secure job, which would allow 
sav ings and the sending back of remittances, is lower, 
and the average size of remittances sent back is smaller. 
According to the NLSS, roughly . 23 per cent of all 
households surveyed received remittances; but the 
proportion for the poorest quintile households was only 
19.2 per cent, that for the wealthiest just over 23 per 
cent, and that for the second wealthiest category, 25. 1 
per cent. This tends to support the view that while 
labour migration involves between one fifth and one 
quarter of all households, it is least among the poorest. 
The average value of remittances received (according to 
the NLSS) also reveals major differences between the 
different categories of household. The two poorest 
categories of household averaged Rs 7, 129 and Rs 8,056 
a year respectively; the third and fourth averaged Rs 
12,396 and Rs 10,322 respectively; and the wealthiest 
category averaged Rs 30,597-more than four times the 
average value of remittances coming in to the poorest 
households. 
The most desirable destinations are often the hardest 
to get to, but these are the locations where, once work 
is obtained, the wages tend to be the highest and the 
value of remittances sent home generally the greatest. 
This tends to mean a double inequality: inequality of 
access to employment abroad, and inequality in terms of 
the potential for remittances to send back home. When 
the poor do migrate, it is generally within Nepal or to 
India, usually to low paid jobs, if they are able to secure 
employment at all. According to the NLSS, India was 
the most important single source of remittances for all 
except the wealthiest households; it was highest of all 
(57 per cent) for the poorest category of household, and 
lowest (23 per cent) for the wealthiest. 
Most favoured destination of all is Japan, where . 
Nepalese workers are able,-if they can find a job-to 
earn relatively high wages and make savings by living 
in cramped and overcrowded conditions. Shanti Nair 
(1998: 66) has pointed out that wage differentials 
between Bangladesh and Japan are as much as 80: 1; for 
Nepal they may well be as high as this, even for the 
relatively well-off Nepalese migrants who tend to secure 
employment there. We have estimated that illegal 
workers in Japan-who are often in better paid jobs 
than those there legally-are generally able to send back 
the equivalent of Rs 80,000 a month to their families, 
while those officially registered are sending back about 
Rs 60,000 a month on average. Workers in Brunei and 
Singapore and those officially in the UK are also able to 
send approximately Rs 60,000 a month on average; 
while those migrants working officially in Switzerland, 
the Philippines and Angola (sic) manageRs 50,000 on 
average. Rs 40,000 is the monthly average remittance 
for official migrant workers in Hong Kong and for 
illegal workers in Singapore; also for those employed in 
the UK. These represent the higher end of the remittance 
scale. 
Those employed unofficially in Europe-in 
Belgium, Germany, Austria and Switzerland-may be 
able to send back on average some Rs 30,000 a month. 
Those employed in North America, although often 
earning good wages or salaries, send back on average 
some Rs 20,000 a month. This would be roughly 
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equivalent to what the value of average remittances from 
those worldng officially in Thailand, or unofficially in 
the UK and Taiwan. In South Korea (wh.ere an 
arrangement to accept Nepalese workers as 'trainees' 
ceased with the 'East Asian meltdown'), Malaysia, 
Australia and Saipan, unofficial migrants have been able 
to send back between Rs 10,000 and Rs 15,000 a 
month on average . Those in the Maldives, we estimate 
can manage only about Rs 6,000 a month. 
But even the lowest level of monthly remittances 
from the West, and from the Far East and South East 
Asia, is significantly higher than the average sent back 
from employment in the Gulf, or in India, for both of 
which we estimate a monthly average remittance per 
person at around Rs 3,000. For India, this may prove 
over-generous . The NLSS estimates on the basis of its 
sample that while India accounts for one third of all 
remittances, the average amount received in 'the 
previous year' was Rs 10,532, compared with the 
average amount from 'other countries' of Rs 79,183. 
This is because the bulk of those working in India are 
in low paid employment. 
"Fully 99 per cent of Nepalis in India are in menial 
jobs" says C. P . Mainali, senior left politician in 
Nepal, who worked for three years organising migrants 
in India. "Only one per cent might be in technical or 
sldlled fields, and less than 0.1 per cent wi II have an 
independent income. There is not a paan shop in the 
name of a Nepali in India, and less than one in a 
thousand is a clerk" (Dixit et al. 1997: 15). "The 
situation of the Nepalis is tenuous," says Sudarshan 
Karld, Delhi Committee Secretary of the All India 
Nepali Unity Society, "those with good jobs may earn 
Rs 2,000, but more are earning Rs 200 (a month)" 
(quoted in Dixit et al. 1997: 15). And while these 
comments may exaggerate the hardship experienced by 
Nepalese workers in India, there is no doubt that the 
bulk of Nepali migrants are in low paid and relatively 
less secure jobs. According to Garima Shah (Delhi-
based activist and social worker): "young boys in 
restaurants and dhabas, illiterate factory labourers, 
domestic help, drivers, chowkidars (watchmen), ayahs 
(nurse maids), this is the lot of the Nepali migrant. A 
few lucky ones make it to the level of lower division 
clerk in a government office, cashiers, receptionists, and 
hawaldars in the Indian police . . . Nepalis are 
everywhere, in the low paying jobs which are most 
visible. There is a saying among us here, that Nepali IG. 
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aloo jaha pani painchha (Nepalese people and potatoes 
are found everywhere)" (Dixit et at. 1997: II). 
Struggling to survive in menial and often degrading 
forms of employment (and this includes work in the 
commercial sex industry), these Nepalese labour 
migrants in India appear also to be able to send 
relatively little to their own households back home, 
although they contribute something like Rs 40 billion a 
year to the Nepalese economy in foreign exchange 
earnings. Not only the scale and national significance of 
foreign labour migration and the remittance economy 
requires consideration, so too does the unequal pattern of 
access to employment, the unequal returns to the 
migrant worker and his or her family in Nepal, and the 
effect on inequality in rural Nepalese economy and 
society. 
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